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The Crowding Out Effect of the 2002 Farm Bill on Hedging:  




The 2002 Food Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act introduced a price protection 
program called Counter Cyclical Payments (CCP) to major grain producers in the US.  The CCP 
program is an addition to the Loan Deficiency Payment (LDP) and Direct Payment (DP) 
programs from the previous 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act.  At 
the same time, US federally subsidized crop revenue insurance programs also protect farmers 
from market and production risks.  These government policy programs may crowd out the 
traditional price risk management role of hedging in commodity futures markets. 
Although the participation rate in futures markets has generally been considered low for 
US crop growers, the 1996 US Department of Agriculture (USAD)’s Agricultural Resource 
Management Study survey suggested use may be increasing.  The survey also indicates hedging 
with futures for risk management being used on 40 to 50 percent of the larger farms (Harwood, 
et al, 1999).  Therefore, it should be interesting to investigate what the optimal hedging level 
should be under current crop insurance programs after implementation of the new provisions of 
the 2002 FSRI Act. 
  Agricultural commodity futures markets have served as price risk management tools in 
the US grain sector for over 100 years.  A vast amount of literature can be found on hedging 
demand and its risk management value (Holthausen, 1979; Lapan, et al, 1991).  Literature also 
exists showing that hedging demand and its risk protection value may be strengthened in the 
presence of crop yield insurance (Dhuyvetter and Kastens, 1999; Coble, et al, 2000), but 
weakened in the presence of crop revenue insurance (Mahul, 2003; Wang, et al, 2003).    
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  However, studies focused specifically on government programs and risk management are 
limited (Krause and Brorsen, 1995; Knutson, et al, 1998; Goodwin, 2001).  From the studies that 
include government programs in risk analysis (Turvey and Baker, 1990; Hennessy, 1998; 
Hanson, et al, 1999; Ke and Wang 2002), none specifically investigate impacts of the new FSRI 
Act policies. 
Additionally, most existing studies on futures hedging and crop insurance are based on a 
single crop, with a few that include two crops (Hennessy, et al, 1997; Ke and Wang, 2002).  
Lence (1996) included another investment opportunity in the portfolio which could capture a 
diversification effect, but such an effect was not explicitly examined.  As a common practice, 
farmers often grow multiple crops in rotation for agronomic reasons.  The inclusion of multiple 
crops may affect hedging demand due to a diversification effect.  Additionally, cross hedging 
may occur since some crops do not have a futures market or access to a revenue insurance 
program. 
The goal of this research is to use a farmer’s expected utility maximization model to 
investigate the impact of the new 2002 FSRI Act on hedging demand in the presence of 
alternative crop insurance programs.  Crop acreage is assumed to be exogenous because the new 
FSRI Act is similar to the 1996 FAIR Act in that both DP and CCP payments are decoupled from 
production.  Specific objectives include: (1) to evaluate the risk management role of the new 
FSRI Act commodity payment programs in the presence of alternative insurance programs, (2) to 
examine the impact of these programs on hedging demand, and (3) to include multiple crops in 
the analysis and explore their impact on hedging demand. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections.  The theoretical framework and 
model are explained in the next section.  A description of the data and model calibration occur  
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following the theoretical framework section.  Empirical results are then presented and discussed.  
The final section presents the summary and conclusions. 
 
Model 
This analysis assumes a representative farmer selects a portfolio of risk management 
instruments at planting time each year, when yields and market prices are uncertain.  The 
portfolio includes hedging with futures, insurance, and government programs.
1  At planting time, 
the farmer places a hedge by selling the futures contract that will mature at harvest time when the 
crop is sold on the cash market.  The farmer also selects a coverage level for one of the available 
insurance products at planting time.  Both the selected insurance products and the hedged 
positions are then settled at harvest.
2  The available insurance products include: (1) a yield 
insurance based on Actual Production History (APH), (2) a revenue insurance with a fixed price 
index based on Income Protection (IP), and (3) another revenue insurance having a price index 
with a replacement feature, based on Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC).
3  A decision by the farmer 
to participate in the government programs is assumed. 
The decision maker’s objective is to maximize his/her expected utility of wealth at 
harvest based on the information available at planting time. 
)] ( [ w U E Max
x , and w = w0 + π,                     (1) 
where x is a vector of choice variables including hedging and insurance coverage levels; E( ) is 
an expectation operator; U( ) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function representing the 
risk attitude of the decision maker; w is the stochastic terminal wealth; w0 is an initial wealth 
level; and π is the profit function from all farmland in the rotation.  Profit is specified as revenue  
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generated from cash sales, hedging, crop insurance indemnities, and government program 
payments less production costs, hedging transaction costs, and insurance premiums. That is: 
π = NP + FI + (YI or RI) + GP,                     (2) 
where: 
  NP = PLY – CY,  
or revenue from selling crops in the cash market less production costs.  PL is the local cash price 
at harvest, Y is the corresponding realized production level, and CY is the cost of producing Y;  
FI = x1E(Y)(F0 –F-TC), 
or net return from hedging.  The choice variable x1 is the hedging quantity chosen at planting 
time expressed as a ratio (positive for a short hedge) of expected production E(Y), F is the 
stochastic futures price at harvest, F0 is the planting time futures price, and TC is the transaction 
cost of hedging, expressed as the rate per bushel hedge; 
YI = Pb max [0, x2E(Y) –Y] – PREy, 
or net indemnity from yield insurance, a stylized APH program.  Pb is the base price for 
insurance purposes, and x2 is the insurance coverage level chosen at planting time.  The yield 
insurance premium is PREy which is set at a specified level; 
RI = max [0, x3PrE(Y) – PPY] – PREr, 
or net indemnity from revenue insurance.  x3 represents the chosen coverage level.  Pr is the price 
used to calculate revenue loss, which can be set at a specified level for IP, or as the higher of the 
local cash market price at harvest or the predetermined level for CRC.  The latter can be 
expressed as Pr= max[PP, Pb].  PP is a terminal cash market price which differs from the local 
cash price PL by a constant transportation cost.  The revenue insurance premium is PREr; and 
GP =DP + LDP + CCP,  
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or total government payments.  Direct Payments (DP) is a constant payment to farmers and is 
equal to 85 percent of a legislated direct payment rate (PD) times the base yield of 0.9E(Y).  The 
loan deficiency payment (LDP) is equal to Ymax[0, LR-PL], where LR is the local loan rate, a set 
price.  The Counter Cyclical Payment (CCP) is set at 85 percent of 0.935E(Y) max[0; PT  – PD - 
max(PSA, LRN )], where PT is a set target price, PSA is the US season average price, and LRN  is 
the national loan rate.  These parameters are set according to current US farm policy.
4  




θ )                      ( 3 )  
where θ is the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient.  This risk preference approach 
represents decreasing absolute risk aversion, is justified in Wang, et al (1998), and has been 
adopted in analyses with a similar focus (Coble, et al, 2000; Mahul, 2003). 
  Because government programs have complicated functional forms, a numerical approach 
is applied based on simulated price and yield distributions.  Per acre based production is used so 
that all production parameters are yield based.  
 
Empirical Analysis and Data 
The Pacific Northwest (PNW) region of the US, represented by the states of Washington, 
Oregon, and Idaho, provides a unique environment to assess risk management strategies for non-
irrigated crop producers.  This region accounts for 15 percent of US wheat production, and 
dominates the US production of soft white wheat, a variety that targets Asian markets.  Within 
the PNW, the Palouse region covers eastern Washington and northern Idaho and has the highest 
non-irrigated winter wheat yields in the US.  The region’s 18 or more inches (460 mm) of annual  
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precipitation allows farmers to use a continuous three-crop rotation.  Winter wheat is the primary 
cash crop, with barley and dry peas in rotation to accomplish economic and agronomic goals. 
Several portfolios of risk management instruments are analyzed in this research.  Based 
on currently available instruments for this region, the portfolios include several combinations of:  
1) wheat futures markets; 2) APH for all crops; 3) IP for wheat and barley; 4) CRC for wheat; 
and 5) all applicable government programs including DP and CCP for wheat and barley, and the 
LDP for wheat, barley, and peas.  Specific portfolios are summarized in Table 1.  To assess the 
risk environment, joint distributions of prices and yields relevant to farms in the Palouse region 
are simulated for the 2002 crop year. 
  Farm-level yields are obtained from the USDA’s Risk Management Agency.
5  This data 
set keeps a maximum of ten years of yield observations (2001 is the most recent year), although 
the ten observed yields may not cover the most recent ten years due to rotation.  These actual on-
farm yield data include 543 observations for wheat, 311 observations for barley, and 258 
observations for peas. 
Because a short period of historical data may not be able to capture disasters that occur 
infrequently, a longer period (64 years) of county-level yield data is used to determine the trend 
and distributional form.  No structural change is detected over this period, and a linear trend 
(with an autoregressive term in the case of wheat) is estimated for each crop.  Farm-level yields 
are assumed to follow the same trend and distributional form as county yields except the 
variance level, which is estimated from the de-trended farm-level yield data.   
Distributional form of crop yield data continues to be a debated issue (Just and Weninger, 
1999; Ker and Coble, 2003; Ramirez, et al, 2003).  Although non-normal distributional forms 
have been used in many yield studies (Mahul, 2003; Moss and Shonkwiler, 1993; Nelson and  
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Preckel, 1989), normal distributions have some distinct advantages.  The normal possesses a 
well-defined multivariate joint distribution, and provides the convenience of constructing a joint 
distribution from independently simulated marginal distributions by a linear transformation.  
Several normality tests (Shapiro-Wilk; Kolmogorov-Smirnov; Cramer-von Mises; Anderson-
Darlin) conducted on county yield residuals after adjusting for trend indicate normality cannot be 
rejected for wheat.  Barley and pea yields also passed the normality tests after removal of one 
severe drought year (1977).  The final estimated models used for simulating yields are normal for 
wheat, and a mixture distribution of two normal components for barley and peas.  The second 
normal component has a very low mean and standard deviation to represent a single disaster year 
with a probability of one in 64.  The probability density function of this mixture distribution 
looks like a bell-shaped normal curve with a small hump on its left tail. 
  Local cash prices are the Portland Grain Exchange (PGE) price less $0.50 per bushel 
(/bu) for wheat, and less $0.43/bu for barley.  The pea cash price is the local cash price.  Since 
the PNW region produces soft white wheat (which has no actively traded futures contact), the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) futures market is used for hedging.  These data are provided by 
the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service and the Chicago Board of Trade.  
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) models have been 
commonly used for the logarithm of commodity cash and futures prices.  For this analysis, wheat 
cash and futures log prices are estimated with a bivariate GARCH model.  Barley and dry pea 
log prices are estimated separately using a univariate GARCH model.  Price models are 
estimated from weekly price data covering the four years prior to the expected planting date for 
the 2002 crop (September 1998 to August 2001 for wheat futures and cash prices, and April 
1998 to March 2002 for barley and pea cash prices).  Then, 2002 harvest price distributions are  
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simulated based on the initial planting time prices.  Wheat planting time prices for the first week 
of September 2001 are $3.69/bu and $2.96/bu for cash and futures, respectively.  The barley and 
pea planting time prices for the first week of April 2002 are $2.22/bu and $7.39 per 
hundredweight (/cwt), respectively.  The mean of the simulated futures price is then adjusted to 
equal its planting level of $2.96/bu in order to avoid any speculating effect from the decision 
model.   
An empirical distribution with 2,000 realizations is simulated for each crop’s price and 
yield.  The independently simulated distributions (wheat cash and futures prices are simulated 
jointly) are converted into a joint distribution by imposing the estimated correlation structure.  
The correlation structure is estimated based on historical yields and harvest prices, and imposed 
by a simple linear transformation because all variables are normally distributed.  Summary 
statistics for the simulated price and yield data are presented in Table 2, along with correlation 
values for the simulated joint distributions. 
The value of the risk aversion coefficient is set at θ = 2, which is based on previous 
research (Wang, et al, 2003; Coble, et al, 2000; Mahul, 2003).  Sensitivity analysis on θ has been 
conducted, and the impact on hedging is small.  Although not reported here, results of these 
sensitivity analyses are available from the authors.  The initial per acre farm wealth is set at $550 
based on the average farm equity in Whitman County which covers the majority acreage in 
Palouse.  Production cost is determined by total rotation budgeted cost of $707 over three acres 
for the three crop rotation, $465 over two acres for the two crop rotation, and $230 per acre for 
winter wheat only (Painter, et al, 1995). 
Transaction costs associated with hedging are set at $0.017/bu, based on a $50 
commission per contract, a margin of $745, and an interest rate of 5 percent.  The prices used to  
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indemnify crop loss in the insurance programs are the CBT September (Sep) wheat futures price 
plus a Portland basis of $0.45/bu for wheat ($3.41/bu); 85 percent of the Sep corn futures price 
during February for barley ($1.90/bu); and the expected local cash price for peas ($7.49/cwt).  
The insurance coverage levels are restricted to be either zero or from 0.50 to 0.85 for wheat and 
barley, and from 0.50 to 0.75 for peas based on currently available insurance policies.   The 
insurance premium is set as the expected indemnity (actuarially fair premium level) multiplied 
by one minus the subsidy rate.  Premium subsidies represent 2002 levels,
6 and no load is 
assumed because the current USDA base premium has a very small load and the administrative 
cost is directly subsidized.   
The DP is set at $0.52/bu for wheat, and $0.24/bu for barley.  The base yield used to 
calculate the per acre payment is set at 90 percent of the expected 2002 yield (see endnote 4).  
The local loan rate for the LDP is $2.90/bu for wheat, $2.14/bu for barley, and $6.33/cwt for 
peas.  The target prices in the CCP are $3.86/bu and $2.21/bu for wheat and barley, respectively.  
The national loan rates for wheat and barley are $2.80 and $1.88, respectively.  The US season 
average wheat price is unknown at planting and therefore a random variable.  The Portland wheat 
(barley) cash price less 50 (43) cents per bushel is used as a proxy for the national season 
average price.
7   
 
Results 
  The optimization choices suggested by decision model (1) are solved numerically using 
GAUSS.  Certainty equivalent (CE) is utilized to evaluate alternative risk management portfolios 
(relative to cash sales) under specified conditions and restrictions.  CE is defined here as the 
amount of money (per acre in this case) that would have to be provided to the farmer to keep him  
  10
or her as well off as providing the farmer with the specified risk management portfolio.  CE can 
be calculated by solving: 
  E[U(w0 + π*)] = E[U(w0 + π0 + CE)]                                                                            (4) 
where π* is the net return from using a specific risk management portfolio at the optimum level, 
and π0 is the net return from selling in the cash market which is defined as NP in equation (2). 
Role of Government Programs, Hedging, and Insurance 
The alternative portfolios include futures contracts, government programs, and each type 
of crop insurance (Table 3).  The alternative risk management portfolios are assessed under 
several different scenarios.  The base scenario is designed to represent the current situation 
(upper left block in Table 3), which includes all government program payments, no insurance 
premium loading, and a futures transaction cost of $0.017/bu. 
Seven alternative risk management portfolios are analyzed for the base scenario.  The 
maximum insurance coverage for wheat CRC, barley APH, and pea APH at 0.85, 0.85, and 0.75, 
respectively, with a zero hedge ratio is identified as the optimum strategy.  Any risk averse 
decision maker should insure for the maximum amount when the insurance is actuarially fair.  
Since the maximum level is always selected, these coverage levels are not reported in the table.  
The futures hedge ratio is zero for all portfolios in the base scenario.  This outcome is different 
compared to earlier results in Coble, et al (2000) or Ke and Wang (2002) when government 
programs did not include the CCP.  The base scenario result is also quite different from results in 
Mahul’s (2003) study, where no government program is included.  Hedging played a significant 
risk management role in these previous studies.  These differing results suggest the CCP protects 
farmers from price risk at no cost, leaving little room for the futures market with the assumed 
transaction cost of $0.017/bu.  
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CRC protects both price and yield risks (relative to APH that protects yield risk only), has 
the price replacement feature (relative to IP), and tends to have the largest amount of premium 
subsidy.  The fact that IP does not consistently have a higher value than APH is also different 
relative to previous research (Wang, et al, 2003; Ke and Wang, 2002).  The likely explanation is 
again the inclusion of the CCP program, which protects against price risk at no cost.  Therefore, 
the price risk protection of IP is not valued as much.  
The CE values ranging from $36.34 (government programs only) to $39.83 (the optimum 
portfolio) are primarily contributed by government program payments.  The expected income 
transfer from government programs is $35.73.  The $0.61 difference between the CE for 
government programs and this expected income transfer is the farmer’s valuation for the price 
risk protection feature of the government programs.  The values of the alternative crop insurance 
products (measured by subtracting total CE from the CE associated with government payments 
only) are between $2.73 and $3.49.  These values include both the expected income transfer from 
the premium subsidy, and the risk management value. 
Some sensitivity analyses are conducted to reveal the risk management value of each 
instrument when the risk preference parameter, the insurance premium loading factor, and the 
premium subsidy are set at different levels.  These results are not reported in the tables, but are 
discussed briefly.  An increased risk aversion scenario looks at the impact of assuming a more 
risk-averse farmer by raising the risk aversion coefficient (θ) from 2 to 3.  Results show that the 
more risk-averse producer has a higher CE for all risk management portfolios as expected.  
However, the increase in CE is quite small (less than $0.50 per acre).  The rank order of the 
portfolios is similar to the base scenario, and all hedge ratios remain at zero.    
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More sensitivity analysis on the crop insurance premium subsidy and loading factors 
reveal that the hedging results are not sensitive to these parameters, but the insurance coverage 
selections are. 
Impact of Government Programs on Hedging and Insurance 
Several scenarios evaluating the impact of each government payment on hedging (with a 
futures transaction cost) are analyzed and reported in the upper portion of Table 3.  The CCP is 
designed to provide extra price risk protection in conjunction with the LDP, as indicated by the 
payment structure in equation (2).  Therefore, the first scenario removes the CCP, the subsequent 
scenario eliminates both the CCP and LDP, and finally all three government payment programs 
are eliminated.  
When the CCP is removed from government payments, just over $7 in CE value is lost 
for each portfolio.  This is primarily caused by a reduction in the income transfer.  The relative 
rank of the portfolios also remains the same.  The CE value for each insurance program (CE-G) 
increases slightly, which is caused by the wealth effect.  The farmer is now more risk averse at 
the lower wealth level, and values the risk protection higher.  However, there is still no hedging.   
Evidently, the remaining LDP provides farmers with free price risk protection, and the futures 
transaction cost along with the basis risk give farmers little incentive to hedge. 
When the LDP is also removed from the farmer’s portfolio, the CE value is reduced by 
about an additional $13.  Even with a transaction cost, hedge ratios become non-zero and vary 
from 13 to 19 percent of expected wheat production.  Under the DP only scenario, the farmer 
does not receive any price risk protection from government programs and has to rely on the 
futures market. The highest hedge ratios are in the portfolios with yield-based insurance (APH) 
or no insurance.  The lowest hedge ratios are in the portfolios with IP.  Hedge ratios are in the  
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middle of the range for those portfolios with CRC.  With the reduced income from no 
government program payments, all instruments are valued higher (CE-G) from the wealth effect.  
IP provides the best protection from price risk, while APH or no insurance provides no price risk 
protection.  CRC also provides price risk protection, but the replacement feature in CRC puts it 
somewhere between IP and APH.  This is because CRC resembles IP when market prices are 
low, and behaves like APH when prices are high.   
When the CCP and LDP payments are both removed, the “Gov. Only” portfolio provides 
only the value of the DP program ($16.30) in the absence of the futures market.  When the “No 
Ins.” portfolio (which includes both futures and the DP program) is compared to the “Gov. Only” 
portfolio, the CE increases by three cents reflecting the value of the futures market.  When the 
DP only scenario results are compared to the corresponding portfolios in the scenario where the 
LDP is available, both the insurance and futures values increase but only by a few cents (note the 
CE value differences in the “CE-G” column).  The lower wealth level makes the farmer more 
risk averse, and the risk management instruments are valued at a higher level. 
In the final scenario (no government programs), futures are utilized with hedge ratios 
ranging from 14 to 20 percent when transaction costs are included.  This is a very small increase 
from the previous scenario where the DP program is available.  The DP program has no risk 
protection function but increases the mean level of wealth, thereby reducing risk preference.  In 
going from the DP only scenario to no government program, more than $16 in CE is lost.  The 
more risk averse farmer now hedges slightly more and values the instruments slightly higher.   
Hedge ratio changes across the four scenarios show that both the LDP and the CCP 
provide price risk protection free of charge.  The futures market could have played a role in price  
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risk management under the current transaction cost, but its potential contribution is replaced by 
these government programs. 
Impacts of Futures Transaction Costs on Hedging 
To assess the impact of transaction costs on hedging, the same scenarios are analyzed 
after eliminating the $0.017/bu futures transaction cost.  The results are reported on the lower 
portion of Table 3.  All hedge ratios are shown increased.  When all government programs are 
included, the hedge ratios change from zero to a low level between 8 and 14 percent.  The one or 
two cents more in the CE measures the risk reducing value of the hedging.  Futures transaction 
costs are not the primary impediment to using futures when the CCP program fills the need for 
price insurance at no cost and no basis risk, however, these costs are still a relevant parameter 
when farmers consider hedging.  
When the CCP is eliminated from government program payments, between 19 and 25 
percent of the expected wheat production will be hedged in the futures market assuming no 
transaction costs.  Introducing transaction-free futures without insurance (“No-Ins.” portfolio), 
increases the CE value by five cents.  When alternative crop insurance products are included in 
the portfolio, CE values increase by four to six cents relative to the scenario when futures 
transaction costs are present.  The net values after accounting for government programs (CE-G 
value) also increase by four to nine cents from the scenario that includes CCP (the base 
scenario).  This value increase is a joint effect from two sources.  First, increased use of hedging 
provides a higher risk protection value.  Second, a lower wealth level from eliminating the CCP 
program means higher risk aversion and the farmer values any risk protection higher.  Again, the 
hedge ratio is higher when yield insurance is used relative to when revenue insurance is used.  
However, the difference is quite small because the revenue insurance coverage is restricted to be  
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85 percent of the mean revenue or less, leaving some potential price variation unprotected.  
Given the high basis risk (the wheat cash and futures price correlation is around 0.5), the hedge 
ratio seems reasonable. 
When the transaction cost is eliminated from the scenario with neither CCP nor LDP, 
hedge ratios increase to a range from 39 to 45 percent, which is about 26 percent higher than the 
case with transaction cost.  Additionally, the net values (CE-G) of the futures and insurance 
portfolios are about 16 cents higher than the “with-transaction” cost scenario.  The scenario that 
eliminates all government programs results in the same hedge ratios as the scenario with only a 
DP program.  The lower CE values are caused purely by the income effect of losing about 
$16.30 from the DP program.   
All the scenarios previously analyzed include results with and without a futures 
transaction cost.  Results generally suggest that hedging levels are sensitive to hedging costs.  
Figure 1 illustrates this impact by plotting hedging levels of the optimum portfolio under 
alternative transaction cost levels.  The two curves represent outcomes without the CCP program 
(DP only and DP combined with the LDP) because there is almost no need for hedging when 
CCP are available irrespective of transaction cost levels.  The hedging level decreases almost 
linearly as the transaction cost increases.  The hedging level reaches zero at $0.014 per bushel 
when the LDP is included.  Without the LDP, the hedge ratio is still about 12 percent at a hedge 
cost of $0.020.  The results between zero and the current transaction cost level of $0.017 are 
consistent with those in Table 3.  Although it is difficult to see due to scale, the slopes of the two 
curves are neither identical nor constant necessarily.   
Impacts of relative levels of government program protection to market price   
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The impact of each government program is assessed in the previous section.  However, 
price risk protection for farmers is also influenced by the level of the government program 
parameters relative to prices, such as the target price and loan rate relative to the expected market 
price.  This impact is now explored using two approaches. First, the market price distribution is 
fixed as previously simulated, but government program parameters are changed hypothetically.  
Second, government program parameters are fixed at current levels, while the market price 
distributions (mean levels) are changed.  
The impact based on the first approach is illustrated in Figure 2.  Figure 2 shows the 
hedging levels under alternative protection levels from the government programs with and 
without a transaction cost for the optimal portfolio (CRC for wheat and APH for barley and 
peas).  As the target price for the wheat CCP program moves from its current level of $3.86 
down to $2.90, the loan rate is maintained at $2.90.  Therefore, the price range from $3.86 to 
$2.90 on the horizontal axis represents impacts from reducing the CCP target price.  When the 
target price drops below $2.90, the CCP program has a zero value and does not impact the 
hedging decision anymore.  Thereafter, the wheat loan rate is allowed to decrease without the 
CCP program from $2.90 to 0 reflecting reduced protection from the LDP program.  When the 
loan rate is zero, government payments reflect only the DP.   
The top curve represents hedge ratios when futures transaction costs are eliminated.  
When the loan rate is below $2 per bushel, the hedge ratio remains constant at 33 percent.  This 
constant rate is because the probability that wheat prices will fall below $2 is low, so growers 
will rarely receive any payment, and they have to hedge in the futures market to manage price 
risk.  When the loan rate increases beyond $2, the hedge ratio drops sharply, until the loan rate 
reaches its current level of $2.90.  Then, the CCP program still won’t start to make payments  
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until the DP program amount is repaid at the target price of $3.42, ($2.90 + the $0.52 direct 
payment).  This $0.52 interval is represented by the flat section of the curve, after which the 
hedge curve starts a new concave decreasing pattern.   
The bottom curve in Figure 2 represents the situation where futures transaction costs are 
present.  The same pattern is observed when government programs provide a loan rate of about 
$1.80, but the hedge ratios are lower when hedging has a cost.  The hedge ratio drops when the 
loan rate increases, and becomes zero when the loan rate reaches $2.50.  However, the 
transaction cost hedge curve is not monotonic like the no transaction cost curve.  When the 
government programs provide very low protection, the hedge ratio is also zero.  This is because 
the grower’s income level is much lower without the income transfer from government 
programs, and the futures transaction cost is weighed more heavily than its price risk protection.  
Therefore, at the assumed $0.017/bu transaction cost level, hedging occurs only when the 
government loan rate for wheat is set around $2.00. 
The effects of government programs on hedging based on changes in market price levels 
are illustrated in Figure 3.  Six additional joint price-yield distributions are simulated.  All other 
attributes remain the same except for the expected wheat cash and futures prices, which deviate 
from the base distribution by -$0.50, -$0.25, $0.25, $0.50, $0.75, and $1 per bushel.   
With a futures transaction cost of $0.017/bu, the hedging level remains at zero until the 
price expectations are $0.75 higher than the base price of $2.96 cash and $3.69 futures.  
However, when the transaction cost is eliminated, the hedging level increases from about zero to 
33 percent as the expected prices rise.  As the expected market prices go up, growers expect to 
receive lower payments from the government programs given the fixed target price and loan rate.   
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Thus, they will depend more on futures hedging to protect their price risks.  The curve is concave 
and converges to a maximum level when the CCP and LDP eventually could make no payments.   
The two approaches have similar results in that when the government program protection 
levels are high relative to expected price levels, futures are not used, and vise versa.  They both 
confirm that government programs “crowd out” hedging in the futures market.  Over the price 
range where the CCP program provides protection from price risk, hedging levels are zero under 
the transaction cost.  If government program parameters remain unchanged, farmers tend to 
hedge more during years with high expected price levels than in the low years.  Or, at the fixed 
expected price level for the base scenario, hedging takes place only when CCP’s are eliminated 
and the loan rate drops to relatively low levels under the same transaction cost. 
Impacts of Multiple Crops in the Rotation 
In order to explore the phenomena of multiple crops, two hypothetical scenarios are 
investigated; a rotation with wheat and barley only and another for wheat alone.
8  Hedging is not 
used when the CCP and LDP are both present at the transaction cost level of $0.017, and the DP 
program does not substantially impact hedging levels as discussed previously.  Therefore, the 
focus is on cases when the CCP is removed (LDP and DP only) and transaction cost is either at 
$0.017 per bushel or eliminated.  Results reported in Table 4 should be compared with the 
scenarios that include wheat, barley, and peas in Table 3.   
Table 4 results suggest there is no difference in the insurance coverage levels relative to 
previous results where all three crops are included.  With zero futures transaction cost, the hedge 
ratios are also similar across the scenarios with different numbers of crops.  However, this is 
driven by the actuarially fair nature of the premium and “free” nature of hedging, and does not 
mean a lack of any diversification effect.    
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The hedge ratio increases from zero to about 10 percent when wheat is the only crop and 
a futures transaction cost is included.  The risk protection benefit of the futures is not large 
enough to cover its transaction cost when three crops are grown on the farm, while the benefit is 
higher when only one crop is grown.  The CE for the futures market alone (CE-G for the “No. 
Ins.” Portfolio) is zero for three crops, one cent for two crops, and nine cents for one crop.  This 
result suggests that a diversification effect for price risk exists when growing multiple crops.  A 
transaction cost enhances the need to replace the risk reduction role of hedging with 
diversification. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
  An expected utility maximization model is used to analyze risk management behavior for 
non-irrigated crop producers under provisions of the 2002 FSRI Act programs.  Representative 
farms growing winter wheat, spring barley, and peas from Whitman County, Washington are 
used to model risk management behavior.  Risk management portfolios that include hedging with 
wheat futures, yield insurance, revenue insurance, government programs, and several plausible 
combinations are analyzed.  The optimum portfolio includes the government programs, and 
revenue insurance (CRC is preferred over IP) combined with APH for those crops not covered 
by the CRC product.  This optimum portfolio is very robust to scenario changes.  
  Results generally suggest that government programs account for the primary value of the 
risk management portfolios available to non-irrigated PNW crop producers.  This reflects both 
the price risk protection associated with the loan deficiency payments (LDP) and counter cyclical 
payments (CCP), and the general increase in certain income.  However, the high income transfer 
from government programs clearly dominates total risk protection values.  Contrary to previous  
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studies when CCP program payments were not available, hedging or combining hedging with 
insurance products plays a very limited role in risk management.  Futures are used only when the 
CCP program is removed from the portfolio and LDP has a very low loan rate, when a futures 
transaction cost is not present, or when the market prices are at a very high level compared to the 
current target price.  Such results suggest that the observed behavior of using little hedging is 
likely rational under both the new 2002 FSRI Act and the 1996 FAIR Act.   
  The dominant role of government program income transfers in risk management value 
certainly has relevant policy implications.  Current farm policy programs have a clear and 
unfavorable impact on the use of market-based instruments (futures) for risk management 
purpose.  Only when the target price is reduced enough to eliminate CCP’s, and the Loan Rate is 
significantly reduced (below $2.50/.bu for wheat) will futures be used if faced with a reasonable 
transaction cost.  Additionally, crop insurance programs play a role in risk management only if 
the current premium subsidy scheme remains.  Adding a normal 30 percent load to the 
actuarially fair premium structure essentially eliminates the use of crop insurance for risk 
management if not subsidized.  Additional policy efforts to encourage the use of market-based 
instruments or crop insurance for risk management should recognize the importance of the 
“crowding out” role of current farm programs. 
When futures are used, hedging levels are positively affected by the inclusion of APH, 
and negatively affected by CRC and IP.  This inverse relationship is more pronounced with IP 
than with CRC.  This result suggests the replacement feature of CRC allows more potential price 
variability to be unprotected.  Futures transaction costs also have a negative impact on hedging.   
Diversification impacts on hedging and insurance from multiple crop rotations commonly 
used in the PNW region are not identifiable under the current government program and crop  
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insurance structure.  However, if the CCP is removed, a diversification impact is demonstrated 
by more hedging when the number of crops decreases from three to one.    
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Table 1.  Summary of Scenarios Considered in the Empirical Analysis 
 
 
 Instruments  Included 





APH  APH IP APH IP CRC
Gov. Only
1  U              
No Ins.
2  U  U             
A_W&B&P
3, 4  U  U  U  U     U    
I_W&B+A_P  U  U  U    U     U   
C_W+A_B&P  U  U  U  U        U 
C_W+I_B+A_P  U  U  U    U       U 
A_W&P+I_B  U  U  U    U    U    
I_W+A_B&P  U  U  U  U      U   
A_W&B  U  U    U     U    
I_W&B  U  U     U     U   
C_W+A_B  U  U    U        U 
C_W+I_B  U  U     U       U 
A_W+I_B  U  U     U    U    
I_W+A_B  U  U    U      U   
A_W  U  U         U    
C_W  U  U             U 
I_W  U  U           U   
 
1 “Gov. Only” means the portfolio includes government programs only. 
2 “No Ins.” means no insurance is included, but futures and government programs are included. 
3 “W” represents wheat, “B” represents barley, and “P” represents peas. 
4 “C”, “I”, and “A” represent the available insurance products, CRC, IP, and APH.  CRC is 
revenue insurance with price replacement, IP is revenue insurance without price replacement, 
and APH is yield insurance.  
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics of the Simulated Joint Distribution of Prices and Yields for the 
Representative Farms in Whitman County, Washington 
 
        Correlation  Coefficients 


















Wheat F  $/Bu.    2.96  0.75   0.70   1.00             
Wheat P  $/Bu.    3.69  0.61   0.52   0.48   1.00           
Wheat Y  Bu.  89.16  14.97  -0.04   0.00  -0.03   1.00         
Barley P  $/Bu.    2.22  0.21   0.23   0.31   0.63  -0.02  1.00       
Barley Y  Bu.  73.17  18.69  -0.43   0.02   0.00   0.11  0.03  1.00     
Pea P  $/cwt    7.39  0.63   0.16   0.05   0.02  -0.01  0.04  0.01   1.00  
Pea Y  Cwt  19.85  5.64  -0.20  -0.02  -0.02   0.38  0.03  0.21  -0.04 1.00
                 
Note:  “F” is futures price, “P” is cash price, and “Y” is yield.  
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Table 3.  Impacts of Government Programs on Hedge Ratios, Insurance Coverage and CE 
 
              Base Scenario              _      No CCP - only DP and LDP _     No CCP and LDP - DP only        No Government Program 
Insurance     Hedge  CE  CE-G
1  Hedge CE  CE-G
  Hedge CE CE-G
  Hedge CE
 
Alternative Ratio  ($)  ($)  Ratio  ($)  ($) Ratio ($)  ($) Ratio  ($) 
  With Futures Transaction Cost         
Gov. Only
2    na  36.34  0       na  29.19  0  na  16.30  0  0.19  0.04 
No Ins.
3     0  36.34  0      0  29.19  0  0.18  16.33  0.03  0.19  0.04 
A_W&B&P
4,5     0  39.34  3.00      0  32.20  3.01  0.19  19.31  3.01  0.20  3.04 
I_W&B+A_P     0  39.15  2.81      0  32.07  2.88  0.13  19.29  2.99  0.13  3.02 
C_W+A_B&P     0  39.83  3.49      0  32.72  3.53  0.16  19.89  3.59  0.17  3.63 
C_W+I_B+A_P
     0  39.55  3.21      0  32.45  3.26  0.15  19.66  3.36  0.16  3.39 
A_W&P+I_B     0  39.07  2.73      0  31.94  2.75  0.18  19.08  2.78  0.19  2.81 
I_W+A_B&P     0  39.43  3.09      0  32.34  3.15  0.14  19.53  3.23  0.14  3.26 
                    
  Without  Futures Transaction Cost         
No Ins.
  0.13  36.35 0.01 0.24  29.24 0.05  0.43  16.49 0.19  0.43  0.19 
A_W&B&P
  0.14  39.36 3.02 0.25  32.27 3.08  0.45  19.47 3.17  0.45  3.20 
I_W&B+A_P  0.08  39.15 2.81 0.19  32.10 2.91  0.39  19.42 3.12  0.39  3.15 
C_W+A_B&P  0.11  39.84 3.50 0.23  32.77 3.58  0.42  20.04 3.74  0.42  3.78 
C_W+I_B+A_P
  0.10  39.56 3.22 0.22  32.50 3.31  0.41  19.80 3.50  0.41  3.54 
A_W&P+I_B  0.13  39.08 2.74 0.24  32.00 2.81  0.44  19.24 2.94  0.44  2.97 
I_W+A_B&P  0.09  39.43 3.09 0.20  32.37 3.18  0.40  19.66 3.36  0.40  3.40 
                 
Note: 
1The column labeled “CE-G” reflects the value of the portfolio after the CE from government programs is removed. 
2 “Gov. Only” means the portfolio includes government programs only. 
 
3 “No Ins.” means no insurance is included, but futures and government programs are included. 
4 “W” represents wheat, “B” represents barley, and “P” represents peas. 
5 “C”, “I”, and “A” represent the available insurance products, CRC, IP, and APH.  CRC is revenue insurance with price replacement, IP is 
   revenue insurance without price replacement, and APH is yield insurance.  
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Table 4.  Impacts of Multiple Crops on Hedge Ratios, Insurance Coverage, and CE in the 
Presence of LDP and DP  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
              With Futures Transaction Cost                      No Futures Transaction Cost   .                         
Insurance              Hedge    Ins. Coverage   CE   CE-G
1       Hedge     Ins. Coverage    CE  CE - G 
Alternative           Ratio    Wheat    Barley   ($)      ($)   Ratio     Wheat   Barley    ($)    ($) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Wheat and Barley                                    Wheat and Barley 
Gov. Only
2  na  na  na          44.01  0  na  na  na  44.01       0 
No Ins.
3  0.06     na  na  44.02  0.01  0.24      na  na  44.13     0.12    
A_W&B
4,5  0.06     0.85  0.85  46.98     2.97   0.25     0.85     0.85     47.10     3.09 
I_W&B  0.00     0.85  0.85  46.78  2.77  0.19     0.85     0.85     46.85     2.84 
C_W+A_B  0.03     0.85  0.85  47.77  3.76   0.22     0.85     0.85     47.87     3.86 
C_W+I_B  0.02  0.85      0.85       47.36     3.35         0.21     0.85     0.85     47.45     3.44 
A_W+I_B  0.05     0.85  0.85  46.58  2.57   0.24     0.85     0.85     46.68     2.67 
I_W+A_B  0.00  0.85      0.85       47.20     3.19         0.20     0.85     0.85     47.28     3.27 
 
                                            Wheat Only         Wheat Only                                     
 
Gov. Only  na   na  na  46.88    0    na        na       na  46.88      0 
No Ins.  0.12     na  na  46.97  0.09    0.22  na  na  47.23    0.35 
A_W  0.12    0.85  na  50.26  3.38  0.23    0.85  na  50.53    3.65 
C_W 0.10    0.85  na  51.97  5.09    0.21    0.85  na  52.20    5.32 
I_W  0.07    0.85  na  50.69  3.81  0.18   0.85  na  50.88    4.00 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: 
1The column labeled “CE - G” reflects the value of the portfolio after the CE from 
government programs is removed.  
2 “Gov. Only ” means the portfolio includes government programs only.
 
3 “No Ins.” means no insurance is included, but futures and government programs are 
included. 
4 “W” means wheat, and “B” means barley. 
5 “C”, “I”, and “A” represent the available insurance products, CRC, IP, and APH.  CRC is 
revenue insurance with price replacement, IP is revenue insurance without price 
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Figure 1.   Impact of Futures Transaction Cost on Hedging for the Optimum Risk Management 
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Figure 2.  Impact of Loan Rate and Target Price Levels on Hedging for the Optimum Risk 
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Figure 3. Impact of Expected Wheat Prices on Hedging for the Optimum Risk Management 







                                                           
1 Options are not considered in this research for three reasons.  First, the focus is on farmers’ risk 
management behavior and the futures market is assumed to be unbiased to rule out speculating.  
Options have limited value compared to futures when unbiased futures are used (Mahul, 2003).  
Second, even if options are used when the futures are biased, the impact of government programs 
(which are free to farmers) on futures and on options should be similar.  Third, adding options 
adds significant complexity to the analysis and adds little information. 
 
2 Only one hedge is assumed, and no early trading is allowed.  This assumption precludes the 
speculative motive (together with the unbiased market assumption) from hedging, and keeps the 
model in the simple two-period framework. 
 
3 All insurance programs considered here are individual farm based programs.  The group 
insurance program is not considered because it is not available in many regions of the US 
including the area used in the empirical analysis. 
 
4  The DP program yield is carried over from the 1996 FAIR Act and assumed to be 0.90 of the 
expected current yield.  The CCP program yield is updated per Base option 4 in the 2002 FSRI 
Act and equal to 0.935 of current yield.  The payment scheme of the CCP provides an additional 
payment so that the grower will receive a price no lower than the target price.  However, because 
the grower receives the DP first and then receives the higher of the loan rate or the market price, 
the DP, market payment and LDP are removed from the CCP program payment.   
 
5 Yield histories for each crop are identified by a policy number, have a county identifier, and 
also include location descriptors of the insured unit.  Thus, it is possible to segregate Whitman 
County high precipitation area farm-level actual yields from other farm locations that constitute a 
majority of the Palouse area.  Farms having less than six actual yield observations are deleted.   
 
6 The current subsidy regime is regressive relative to the chosen coverage levels.  The 
corresponding subsidy rate for each of the coverage levels from 50% to 85% with a 5% 
incremental is:  67%, 64%, 64%, 59%, 59%, 55%, 48%, and 38%.  In the analysis, the coverage 
level is allowed to be selected on a continuous basis to identify slight differences by using a 
fitted continuous function of subsidy rates. 
 
7 Historically, the US season (12-month) average wheat price is highly correlated with the 
adjusted harvest (September) Portland price (ρ = 0.92 from 1982 to 2001). They also have very 
close means, $3.21 versus $3.26, and standard deviations, $0.59 versus $0.71. Therefore, using 
the adjusted Portland price provides a very close approximation of the US season average price 
for calculating the CCP payment.  The same reason holds for barley. 
 
8 From an agronomic point of view, these two rotations are not ideal in the high precipitation 
region.  However, these cropping patterns with fallow in the rotations exist in the PNW for the 
intermediate rainfall area (annual precipitation of 14 to 18 inches), and the dry area (annual 
precipitation of 9 to 13 inches).   